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The scholarship on the punishment programs of the Allies in Ger-
many after the Second World War is unbalanced. It is heavily weighted
toward the origins and course of the trial of the major war criminals at
Nuremberg. Relatively, there is only a tiny amount dealing with the Al-
lied prosecution of Nazi criminals beyond that well-known trial. Owing
to this focus, detailed research has, for the most part, been on the creation
of legal means for dealing with Nazism. While we know that the Allied
trial programs were limited in many ways, and that most Nazi criminals
escaped completely or received lenient treatment,1 there has been no me-
thodical inquiry into the relationship of those limitations to punishment
policy as a whole. This article seeks to help redress the balance by illus-
trating how in the case of British prosecutions, punishment policy was
for the longer period one of a gradual dismantling of the legal machinery.
It does this by means of a more comprehensive and systematic history
of British policy than has hitherto been written, examining as an inter-
related whole the trial of the major war criminals, the trials of other cate-
gories of (‘‘lesser’’) criminals, the political and practical problems of
prolonged accounting for mass criminality, and the processes of prema-
ture release of convicted criminals.
The article will address British war crimes trial policy in Germany
up to 1957, spanning the period from the first trial to the exit of the last
Donald Bloxham is lecturer in twentieth-century history at the University of Edin-
burgh. He is currently researching the history of the Armenian Genocide. He wishes to
thank the two anonymous readers for their suggestions on the article.
1 See the somewhat sensational Tom Bower, Blind Eye to Murder: Britain, America
and the Purging of Nazi Germany—a Pledge Betrayed (London, 1997); and on the gen-
eral problems of occupation justice, see Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern:
Sa¨uberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanische Besatzung (Frankfurt am Main,
1972).
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prisoner from Werl jail in the erstwhile British zone of occupation. That
time frame encompasses a series of quantum shifts in policy toward Ger-
many. The transitions from wartime to peacetime status and thence to
the cold war, and the accompanying debates about West German political
and military integration into Western Europe, were vital in the process,
but longer-standing cultural factors, legal criteria, and short-term logisti-
cal considerations also played important roles in ending the punishment
program. To set these developments in their historical context, we begin
in the first two sections by looking briefly at the well-charted early course
of British and Allied trial policy, and the legal implications of the largest
of all the trial ventures in which the British were involved, that of the
major war criminals at Nuremberg. Those examinations show the early
establishments of limitations on the potential development of the British
program in particular and illustrate how the scene was set for a (pro-
tracted) winding down of punishment policy, even as the extent of Nazi
criminality was becoming more apparent.
The Early Course of British Trial Policy
In October 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt proclaimed that ‘‘the pun-
ishment of [Nazi] crimes should now be counted among the major goals
of the war.’’2 The questions of whom precisely to hold responsible, and
for what, and what form the punishment should take were not yet the
main issue. Two years later, some answers were provisionally provided
when, at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Britain, the
United States, and the USSR declared that
at the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may
be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of
the Nazi party who have been responsible for or who have taken part in
[various aforementioned] atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent
back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order
that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of those liber-
ated countries and of the Free Governments which will be erected therein.
. . . [T]he above declaration is without prejudice to the case of major crimi-
nals whose offences have no particular geographical location and who will
be punished by a joint declaration of the Governments of the Allies.3
Many smaller nations thus undertook their own trial programs. In-
deed, most of the member countries of the United Nations War Crimes
2 John Tusa and Ann Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial (London, 1995), p. 21.
3 Cited in ibid, pp. 23–24.
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Commission (UNWCC)—the first body to consider in detail the issue
of punishment and the only fully international one—had been actively
using that organization as a forum for the investigative works of their
own national commissions since its establishment late in 1943.4 The Brit-
ish government had also decided by November 1944 to prosecute certain
German crimes committed against Allied nationals. In anticipation of the
majority of criminals being extradited to the nations directly concerned
with their cases, this program was expected to revolve predominantly
around crimes against British personnel.5 Yet with the division of Ger-
many by the victors, and indeed as one of the chief Allies, Britain also
acquired the additional responsibility of prosecuting crimes committed
previously in its zone of occupation.
The British zonal trials were conducted under a piece of legislation
known as the Royal Warrant. Proceedings pursuant to that legislation
were prosecuted by the Judge Advocate General’s Department of the
Army (JAG). Behind the legislation was a series of inter- and intraminis-
terial debates about the legality of such proceedings, with particular em-
phasis on matters of jurisdiction over crimes committed in Axis territory
or Axis-occupied regions outside the direct context of warfare, or against
nationals of Axis states, because these did not fit within the definition
of war crimes as traditionally circumscribed (war crimes stricto sensu).
The first case to be heard began on 17 September 1945 and concerned
the senior staff of the Belsen concentration camp, several of whom had
also served at Auschwitz, and a number of inmate functionaries; there
were forty-five defendants in all. The case lasted for two months. Eleven
of the defendants were sentenced to death, nineteen to prison terms vary-
ing from one year to life, and fourteen were acquitted.6
Despite the ‘‘Belsen trial,’’ and preparatory developments among
various UNWCC member countries, and despite the aforementioned
Moscow declaration, well into 1945 inter-Allied policy on major war
criminals remained uncoordinated. The institution of an International
Military Tribunal (IMT) to try some of the leaders of the Third Reich
derived from interdepartmental debate in the U.S. government. The con-
cept of what emerged as the trial of Hermann Go¨ring and twenty-one
others had to be sold to the remaining Allies. It was not inevitable that
4 See United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War
Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (London, 1948); and Arieh
Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998).
5 Priscilla Dale Jones, ‘‘British Policy towards German Crimes against German Jews,
1939–1945,’’ Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 36 (1991): 339–66.
6 Raymond Phillips, ed., The Trial of Josef Kramer and Forty-Four Others (London,
1949).
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these particular Germans, and the Nazi organizations deemed complicit
in their wrongdoing, would reach a courtroom. In the precedent-bound
legal world it was certainly no foregone conclusion that they would face
the type of charges that they eventually did.
In early negotiations about the nature of the peace, Churchill and
members of his cabinet favored summary execution of a large group of
arbitrarily defined Nazi leaders, over and above those ‘‘lesser’’ perpetra-
tors who would be given the benefit of trial. The guilt of the former was
simply too obvious for trial, it was held, while the unprecedented nature
of the proceedings in question rendered them legally problematic. (Prose-
cuting foot soldiers for easily definable acts such as the murder of POWs
was grounded in legal practice whereas punishing a politician for his
role in ‘‘acts of state’’ such as the subjugation of another country was
not.) The courtroom might also provide a platform for revanchist Nazi
propaganda, the British contended.7 A more extreme position was taken
by an American lobby centered on the Department of the Treasury and
its secretary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
The Treasury Department was aware of some of the realities of the
war in Europe as it had close contacts with the War Refugee Board. The
latter body had been established in 1944 in a belated American recogni-
tion of the seriousness of the plight of the Jews, as an attempt to provide
relief and facilitate rescue. It became a key conduit for information about
the ongoing ‘‘final solution of the Jewish question’’ and for pressure on
behalf of its victims. Morgenthau’s anti-Germanism was manifested in
demands for the emasculation of the country by the execution of its lead-
ers, by deindustrialization and pastoralization.8
The representatives of the USSR favored a trial of some description
of a group of leading Nazis, perhaps for propaganda purposes similar to
those served by their previous ‘‘purge’’ trials. In any case, this idea was
a close approximation to another American proposal forwarded as a
counter to the ‘‘Morgenthau plan.’’ The rival Department of War under
Henry Stimson wished to divert President Roosevelt from his enthusiasm
for Treasury’s idea, recognizing that not only was deindustrialization
impractical (and immoral) but that it might sow the seeds of discontent
for a third world war. Conversely, extending ‘‘due process’’ to promi-
nent Nazis was morally unimpeachable and would have the benefit of
7 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp. 25–28, 61–64; Bradley F. Smith, The
Road to Nuremberg (London, 1982), pp. 45–46.
8 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp. 50–51; Smith, The Road to Nuremberg,
pp. 25–29. Such an approach also had British advocates.
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exposing the evils of that regime for the instruction of the publics of the
world and of posterity, thereby hopefully preventing their repetition.9
Self-evidently, the trial option won the day. It achieved predomi-
nance in the United States in the final quarter of 1944, aided by the
propaganda value the Morgenthau plan yielded to Josef Goebbels in his
attempts to make the Germans fight to the last, and also by the outrage
provoked in December at the murder in Malme´dy, Belgium, of American
troops by a Waffen-SS division. By April 1945 some form of legal action
against prominent war criminals was all but certain, particularly when
the death of Roosevelt resulted in the succession to the presidency of
Truman, a firm supporter of the trial idea.10 In addition, the machinery
had by that time been put substantially into place for a lower-key set of
trials of lesser Nazis in the territory being overrun by U.S. forces.11 The
multinational flavor of the prosecution of the major war criminals was
achieved by Soviet and then French acquiescence in the principle of trial
of the ‘‘major war criminals.’’ The British government and officialdom
was the last to concur, never really overcoming their fears about the
propriety and wisdom of such a trial. They ultimately only surrendered
to the united front of their allies.12
The Trial of Hermann Go¨ring et al.
The trial resulting from these negotiations was held before the IMT,
which was composed of judges from each of the four prosecuting nations.
The tribunal sat in judgment over a group whose criminal activities, in
the words of the Moscow declaration, had ‘‘no specific geographical lo-
cation’’: in other words, the makers and higher administrators of broad
policy rather than the direct executors. In recognition of the extreme and
peculiar nature of Nazi criminality, the IMT had to adjudicate on actions
that did not correspond to breaches of the ‘‘laws of war’’ as such. These
included persecutions before the outbreak of war and against Axis nation-
als, crimes committed during wartime but outside of war situations (the
so-called crimes against humanity that were beyond the remit of the
9 For extensive details of these interdepartmental rivalries, see chap. 1 of Smith, The
Road to Nuremberg; and Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp. 51–54.
10 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp. 61–67; and Smith, The Road to Nurem-
berg, pp. 54–55 and chap. 7.
11 Institut fu¨r Zeitgeschichte, Munich, FG 16, Report of the Deputy Judge Advocate,
fol. 3, for the dates of U.S. ‘‘Dachau’’ trial preparations. On the U.S. ‘‘Dachau’’ trial
series, see Robert Sigel, Im Interesse der Gerechtigkeit: Die Dachauer Kriegsverbrecher-
prozesse, 1945–48 (Frankfurt am Main, 1992).
12 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp. 66–67.
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Royal Warrant), and ultimately, and most controversially, the very act
of aggressive war itself.
The implementation of the prosecution plan was orchestrated by the
U.S. Office of Chief-of-Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality
(OCCPAC) under the leadership of Supreme Court Justice Robert H.
Jackson. The plan was the brainchild of a Col. Murray C. Bernays of
the War Department. It posited the pursuit of continental and world domi-
nation as the central idea of Nazism, and aggressive warfare as the ulti-
mate and all-inclusive crime. One necessary manifestation of the quest
for conquest, it was held, was the repression and murder of real and
conceptual opponents of the regime. The plan as it was implemented,
rather contrary to Bernays’s intentions,13 distorted the essence of Nazism
for it implied that warfare provided the stimulus to atrocity. That was
only partially true, and downplayed the role of Nazi ideological hatred
of the victim groups. Jackson described the intention of the planners as
‘‘to try in two phases the question of war guilt. The first phase would
be to establish the existence of a general conspiracy to which the Nazi
party, the Gestapo and the other organizations were parties. The object
of the conspiracy was to obtain by illegal means, by violation of treaties,
and by wholesale brutality control of Europe and the world. When this
plan should be proved, the second phase would be entered upon which
would consist of the identification of individuals who were parties to this
general conspiracy.’’14
The Office of Chief-of-Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Crimi-
nality was, therefore, deploying a theory that implicated most of the Ger-
man state. The organizations to which Jackson referred were the leader-
ship corps of the Nazi Party, the Reich government cabinet, the SS,
the Gestapo and SD (the SS intelligence organization), the SA, and the
‘‘General Staff and High Command of the Armed Forces.’’ Most of the
twenty-two defendants who reached trial were indicted both for their in-
dividual criminal responsibility and as representatives of one or other of
these organizations. In OCCPAC’s conceptualization, evidence against
an individual could then also be held against organization, and vice versa.
The logic of this idea was that given the obvious mass criminality of Nazi
Germany, some method of expediting mass prosecution was necessary; a
finding of organizational guilt would supposedly hold for every member
of that organization.
13 Shlomo Aronson, ‘‘Preparations for the Nuremberg Trial: The OSS, Charles
Dwork, and the Holocaust,’’ Holocaust and Genocide Studies 12 (1998): 257–81, here
261–64.
14 Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., container
191, ‘‘Justice Jackson’s story,’’ fols. 1046–47.
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The reality of the trial did not correspond entirely with the American
vision of it. The Office of Chief-of-Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis
Criminality set the tone by opening the prosecution’s case with the con-
spiracy count that it had helped to bring into existence. In the process
OCCPAC presented much evidence of the ‘‘subsidiary’’ crimes against
both the laws of war and—where they did not overlap—of humanity.
This upset both the French and Soviet delegations who not only opposed
the conspiracy charge (which in the way it was framed was alien to con-
tinental law, deriving from English common law) but also considered
much of the thunder to have been stolen from their presentations, on
war crimes and crimes against humanity in Western and Eastern Europe,
respectively.15 The British—who presented the evidence on ‘‘crimes
against peace,’’ including the breaking of treaties and acts of aggressive
warfare—similarly preferred to concentrate on substantive crimes.16
Each nation presented its case in its own distinct way, establishing
the prosecution more as a quadripartite affair than the international pro-
ceeding it purported to be. The Office of Chief-of-Counsel for the Prose-
cution of Axis Criminality, in its determination to create an irrevocable
historical record, generally avoided calling witnesses, believing them to
be unreliable and open to refutation. It chose instead to deluge the tribu-
nal with the ample Nazi correspondence that had survived the regime.
Though a boon for historians, this documentary cornucopia detracted im-
mensely from the contemporaneous attraction of the trial as a spectacle.
Eyewitnesses to the most horrendous crimes of Nazism were brought
only by the French and Soviets, but by this time—the beginning of
1946—public interest had long since waned.
Nevertheless, the IMT judgment, along with its extensive written
opinion and the vast array of documentation adduced and subsequently
published, afforded just the sort of historical record of Nazi criminality
that Stimson and Jackson had in mind when they were pushing for trial.
Though it undoubtedly and unsurprisingly failed to convince every Ger-
man of the error of his or her ways,17 the trial itself, if tortuously long
and undoubtedly imperfect in some of its procedures and outcomes, was
a competent exercise in being seen to be fair. For the most part its inner
workings have also stood up to extensive historical scrutiny.18
15 Ibid.; Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York, 1977),
pp. 82–90.
16 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, p. 83.
17 See, e.g., Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfa¨nge der Bundesrepublik
und die NS-Vergangenheit (Munich, 1996), on German reactions to the Nazi past and the
occupation period.
18 For example, Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg.
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On the legal level, three of the defendants—Franz von Papen, Hans
Fritzsche, and Hjalmar Schacht—were acquitted, twelve were sentenced
to death, and the remainder to varying terms of imprisonment. The SS,
the Gestapo and SD, the Reich Cabinet, and the Nazi Party leadership
corps were all declared to be criminal organizations. The death sentence
on General Alfred Jodl, the sentences on Albert Speer and Grand Admi-
ral Karl Do¨nitz, and the acquittals (particularly of Papen and Schacht)
elicited, for varying reasons, surprise and condemnation, yet illustrate
that the outcome of the trial was by no means a foregone conclusion.
Of greater significance both for the development of international law and
for the purge of Germany were the limitations imposed by the IMT on
the ambitions of the conspiracy-criminal organization plan.
The tribunal was not prepared to accept the rather nebulous conspir-
acy concept as it was projected by OCCPAC. The IMT declared that the
conspiracy could not be traced convincingly back to the early days of
Nazi power and instead had to be judged only in close chronological
proximity to the war. Equally, the conspiracy was limited in its applica-
tion to the preparation for aggressive war and not to the planning of war
crimes and crimes against humanity.19 The idea of guilt by association
was also strictly circumscribed. Members of the criminal organizations
could only be declared criminal themselves if it could be shown that they
had joined voluntarily with an awareness of the criminality—in terms of
‘‘war crimes’’ and ‘‘crimes against humanity’’—of the organization.20
It is impossible to predict what would have happened had the blanket
accusations against the organizations been upheld. Clearly though, the
fact that the judgment imposed a burden of proof in each individual case
on the prosecutor demanded an exponentially greater effort in further
prosecutions than would otherwise have been necessary. As will become
clear, neither the resources nor the political will were present to pursue
this gargantuan task.
The organization and conspiracy judgments showed that the doubts
of the continental jurists and of British officialdom about the American
innovations were to an extent justified. Despite the British reservations,
however, the British War Crimes Executive—the British approximation
to OCCPAC—and the two British judges contributed fulsomely to pro-
ceedings, whether in Deputy Chief Prosecutor David Maxwell-Fyfe’s
rapier penetration of Go¨ring’s defense or in Sir Geoffrey Lawrence’s
temperate presidency of the tribunal. Nor was it simply a question of
19 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, chap. 17.
20 Ibid.; Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (London, 1993),
chap. 20.
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individual participation. Once the decision had been made to embark on
the trial venture, the relevant British agencies—the Foreign Office, the
War Office, the JAG, the Lord Chancellor’s Office, and the Attorney
General’s Office—were determined to make it a success, realizing that
they had become embroiled in something of great significance for the
postwar world.
The IMT trial then was as much a political phenomenon as it was
legal. Political movement had brought it into being, defined some of its
ends and ensured its relative success. Yet, when directed negatively, the
potential that had been deployed for a constructive purpose was equally
potent. Cold war politics, in combination with a series of structural and
economic factors and with developments in the IMT case, determined
when the trial idea was no longer of utility. In fact, well before the end
of the trial of the major war criminals, it was a matter of consensus in
diplomatic circles that those proceedings were to be sui generis. British
machinations were at the very heart of the decision not to try further
‘‘major’’ war criminals before multinational courts, and they provided
a very clear signal about the limited future of British war crimes trials
of any sort.
The Aborted Second Trial of Major War Criminals21
A nonevent at the IMT trial leads into this subplot. It concerns one
of the men who was originally slated for prosecution but who did not
reach trial. As Justice Jackson saw it, the logic of the conspiracy plan
demanded the indictment of private industry alongside the Nazi state
economy. The final selection of defendants included one main representa-
tive of each, both selected for their involvement in German rearmament,
which was in turn viewed as part of the master plan for pursuing aggres-
sive war. Hjalmar Schacht, erstwhile Reichsbank president and a chief
contributor to the Nazi economic miracle, was held to be an orchestrator
of this conspiratorial policy, while the Krupp firm was seen as the willing
foil, supplying the state with the material means of conquest and subjuga-
tion. The renowned Essen dynasty had supplied guns to the Nazis as the
family firm had to Germany for generations, and the two most recent
Krupp figureheads were at Nuremberg.
There was some disagreement as to which of the two should stand
trial as representative of the firm. Gustav had been in charge until 1942,
21 For an expansion of the subject matter in this section, see Donald Bloxham, ‘‘ ‘The
Trial That Never Was’: Why There Was No Second International Trial of Major War
Criminals at Nuremberg,’’ History 87 (2002): 41–60.
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when illness and old age compelled him to step down in favor of his
son Alfried, who retained control until the occupation. Though less fit
for trial, Jackson wanted Gustav indicted, since his role in the prewar
period made him a more appropriate candidate for OCCPAC’s favored
charges of criminal conspiracy and crimes against peace.22 Alfried was
more responsible under the other two counts for the firm’s exploitation
of slave labor in the second half of the war.
The American wish once again prevailed, and Gustav was indicted.23
The extent of his dementia, however, properly ruled him unfit for trial.
Yet rather than fading away, the Krupp issue now gave immediacy to
demands made by the French and the Soviets for a second trial of other
‘‘major’’ war criminals, such as had been suggested earlier in the prepa-
rations.24 Though in a less conceptual, more pragmatic way, the economic
part of the case was as important to the continental states as it was to
Jackson, for both countries had experienced great exploitation and de-
struction of their resources under occupation.
The French, it was judged by a British prosecutor, wished to try
industrialists not only for their own actions but in order to ‘‘strengthen
the hand’’ of the French authorities in dealing with collaborationist
French industrialists.25 The Soviets harbored the simplistic determinist
view that Hitler was an instrument of German bankers and big business.26
Conversely, the British Foreign Office and sections of the American
prosecution were worried about the prominence of the economic case
in OCCPAC’s scheme. The former, in particular, feared that the case
against Schacht was weak enough to bring an acquittal (and indeed it
was), to say nothing of the prospects of proving the participation in a
state conspiracy of a private industrialist like Krupp.27
The outcome of French agitation over the issue, however, was that
British chief prosecutor Hartley Shawcross, in an attempt to ensure the
timely initiation of the trial, assured his French counterpart Franc¸ois de
Menthon that the British would participate in a second international trial
22 Airey Neave, Nuremberg: A Personal Record of the Trial of the Major War Crimi-
nals (London, 1978), pp. 30–32, 212. As well as contributing to Germany’s illegal rear-
mament after Versailles, Gustav was thought to have organized contributions from indus-
try to the Nazi Party after 1933.
23 Taylor, Anatomy, pp. 90–94; William Manchester, The Arms of Krupp, 1587–1968
(New York, 1970), pp. 8–9; Neave, Nuremberg, pp. 29–32.
24 At the London Conference of June–July 1945.
25 Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO), War Office (WO) 311/39, Max-
well-Fyfe to BWCE, 25 January 1946.
26 Neave, Nuremberg, p. 209; David W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Eu-
rope, America and Postwar Reconstruction (London, 1992), pp. 52–53.
27 Taylor, Anatomy, pp. 80–92.
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against a group of industrialists including Alfried.28 A quadripartite com-
mittee of prosecutors was established during the IMT trial to discuss this
proposal, and the chief prosecutors of each country also met periodically
to the same end.
While Shawcross considered that his promise had bound Britain to
the French in a future trial,29 other interested British parties were not so
resigned. Importantly, the Treasury Solicitor’s Office feared the potential
cost of a second international proceeding;30 this was in the context of
the damage done to the British economy during the war and the cost of
sustaining the most populous zone of occupation in Germany. The For-
eign Office was less happy still, wary of a second lengthy trial, which
they feared would be anticlimactic and would detract from the achieve-
ments of the first. While not wishing to be seen to be letting off the
industrialists, they felt that the IMT trial was a sufficient measure of their
commitment to the cause of the trials, and they could point quite genu-
inely to the lack of public interest in another showpiece trial. Finally,
an important strand of foreign-political thought suggested that a trial of
industrialists could degenerate into ‘‘a wrangle between the capitalist and
communist ideologies.’’ ‘‘The Russians,’’ contended Permanent Under-
secretary Orme Sargeant, ‘‘might exploit the proceedings to discuss irrel-
evancies such as . . . [the British] attitude to German rearmament.’’31
The Shawcross–de Menthon pact did not actually guarantee that
another trial would transpire. Though the London Agreement establishing
the trial of the major war criminals made provision for a series of trials
before the IMT, any power could terminate the agreement with one
month’s notice. The Office of Chief-of-Counsel for the Prosecution of
Axis Criminality had not committed itself to a further international trial.
By the end of 1945, a consensus emerged among Jackson, the U.S. War
Department, and the Office of Military Government for Germany (OM-
28 PRO, Premier (PREM) 8/391, Orme Sargeant to Clement Attlee, 31 July 1946;
Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, concludes that ‘‘for the British the desire for a
prompt start always overcame any other consideration’’ (p. 138).
29 Jackson Papers, container 98, Office Files, U.S. chief-of-counsel, chief prosecutors’
meeting of 5 April 1946; Shawcross to Jackson, 25 July 1946, cited in app. J in Telford
Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials
under Control Council Law No. 10 (Washington, D.C., 1949), pp. 283–84. See also PRO,
Foreign Office (FO) 371/57583, Shawcross to Basil Newton, 28 February 1946.
30 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, p. 373.
31 Frederick Elwyn Jones, In My Time: An Autobiography (London, 1983) p. 126;
PRO, PREM 8/391, Sargeant to Attlee, 31 July 1946; see also comments throughout this
file. Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace (Oxford, 1990), pp. 25–28, and p. 78 on the
importance of Sargeant. In a low-profile case the British did try two industrialists of the
Tesch and Stabenow firm who had supplied the poison gas Zyklon B to the SS. See
United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 15
vols. (London, 1947), 1:93–103.
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GUS) that this form of procedure was undesirable and that other major
war criminals were best tried by the individual occupying powers.32 This
line of thought was roughly parallel to that in Whitehall and was founded
in the ongoing and decisive changes that had colored the international
political scene since the inception of the IMT idea. In combination with
the events of the IMT trial itself, the rapidly emerging cold war ensured
that the ‘‘subsequent trial’’ did not materialize.
Probably before its American counterpart, Whitehall saw that Ger-
many would have to be resurrected in some form, as the mainstay of a
central European power bloc designed to check the advance of com-
munism. Alongside the economic factor—making Germany more self-
sufficient and reducing the size and cost of the military government—
by mid-1946 this impulse had grown to be stronger than any fear of a re-
vival of German nationalism.33 Hence trials of Germany’s former leaders
came to be seen as detrimental to Britain’s interests, particularly if those
trials were conducted in tandem with the Soviets.
In August 1946, by which time Capitol Hill had long since reached
conclusions similar to those of the British Foreign Office, Ernest Bevin
proceeded to raise the issues with his opposite number, James Byrnes,
at a conference in Paris. Bevin observed that Shawcross’s pledge prohib-
ited open British opposition to a second trial but suggested that, were
the Americans to take the lead against it, they would receive British
support.34 Byrnes concurred.35 In the second half of September, Jackson
asked the State Department to notify the other powers of the official
United States opposition to the trial; and in the next month he submitted
his final report to President Truman formalizing his own position. The
United States issued notes in January 1947 to its erstwhile confederates to
the effect that further proceedings before the IMT were ‘‘not required.’’
‘‘German war criminals,’’ it was held, could be tried ‘‘more expedi-
tiously . . . in national or occupation courts.’’36 As regards the major
war criminals not included in the IMT case, the American authorities
were certainly more determined than their British counterparts that such
32 National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Md. (hereafter
NARA), Record Group (RG) 260, OMGUS, Adjutant General’s Decimal Files, 1945–
48, box 2, W. B. Smith to Jackson, 5 December 1945; General McNarney to chief of
staff, Washington, D.C., 5 December 1945.
33 Deighton, The Impossible Peace, pp. 78, 115, 224.
34 National Library of Wales, Papers of Lord Elwyn Jones, C14, Elwyn Jones to
Warren, 9 August 1946; Scott-Fox to Maurice Reed, 15 August 1946. See also Taylor,
Final Report, pp. 25–26.
35 PRO, Lord Chancellor’s Office (LCO) 2/2989, Scott-Fox to Reed, 18 August 1946;
Elwyn Jones papers, C14, Elwyn Jones to Shawcross, 22 August 1946.
36 Taylor, Final Report, app. K, p. 285, substance of note addressed to London, Mos-
cow, and Paris Embassies, 22 January 1947.
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trials would transpire. Indeed, a ‘‘subsequent proceedings division’’ had
been established within OCCPAC as early as January 1946 to plan for
future trials at Nuremberg—in whatever form they took—of ‘‘major war
criminals of the second rank,’’ including industrialists.37
In July 1946, the American Nuremberg staff had been informed by
the British JAG that the latter intended to pursue a program of trials in the
British zone that was to be ‘‘roughly parallel’’ to the American program.
Prisoner exchange was to facilitate a ‘‘division of business’’ in this re-
gard.38 As had been previously observed within the Foreign Office, how-
ever, if Britain’s allies chose to indict industrialists, the British were not
bound to do likewise. The only obligation was to transfer on request
suspects whom the occupation authorities did not intend to try them-
selves.39 Thus the Foreign Office willingly transferred six industrialists,
including Alfried Krupp, and three other suspects, for trial in the Ameri-
can ‘‘subsequent Nuremberg proceedings,’’ and this despite the fact that
the nerve center of Krupp’s operations—the Ruhr—lay within the British
zone of occupation.40 Many more British prisoners were to follow.
Under Brigadier General Telford Taylor, OCCPAC’s successor or-
ganization, the Office of Chief-of Counsel for War Crimes (OCCWC),
went on to prosecute 185 ‘‘second rank’’ major war criminals—includ-
ing senior civil servants and Nazi Party members, soldiers, businessmen,
and SS personnel—in twelve large-scale trials at Nuremberg. Many of
these trials featured suspects surrendered by the British authorities, in-
cluding Karl Brandt, Oswald Pohl, and Otto Ohlendorf,41 the chief defen-
dants in OCCWC’s first, fourth, and ninth trials, and Erhard Milch, the
only defendant in the second trial. In addition, the American military
authorities continued to prosecute the direct implementers of Nazi atroc-
ity at the former concentration camp at Dachau and elsewhere in the
U.S. zone. In contrast, Britain only conducted an approximate parallel to
37 University of Connecticut Archives, Papers of Thomas J. Dodd, box 319, file
‘‘General memoranda 1945 Oct.–1946 Apr.,’’ general memorandum no. 3, ‘‘subsequent
proceedings division,’’ 12 January 1946.
38 John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Papers of Drexel Sprecher, box 57, file ‘‘Admin-
istrative matters,’’ memorandum for all section heads from Telford Taylor, 23 July 1946.
39 PRO, FO 371/57583, Basil Newton to Hartley Shawcross, 26 March 1946; PRO,
LCO 2/2989, Sargeant to the lord chancellor, 23 October 1946.
40 PRO, FO 937/143, secret memo from permanent secretary of FO, 16 September
1946; PRO, LCO 2/2989, Garner to Shawcross, 2 October 1946; Control Commission
for Germany (CCG), Berlin, to Control Office for Germany and Austria (COGA), 21
September 1946; PRO, FO 937/143, FO minute, 17 October 1946; PRO, LCO 2/2989,
Sargeant to lord chancellor, 23 October 1946; PRO, FO 371/57583, minute by Beaumont,
13 April 1946.
41 PRO, FO 371/57576, u436/436/73; PRO, WO 309/1455 contains a series of extra-
dition requests, including one for Ohlendorf; Taylor, Final Report, pp. 77–78.
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the latter series of trials, dissociating itself from the extended Nuremberg
venture.42 The emphasis was now on closure.
The Lesser War Criminals and the Closure of the
Trial Program
Beyond the showpiece IMT trial and the delicate question of the
further ‘‘majors,’’ the British continued to pursue lesser malefactors for
trial under the Royal Warrant. Yet the vast number of suspects created
in the criminal state that was Nazi Germany made a proper accounting
with each of them all but impossible. This would have been the case
even in an ideal world, and occupation politics was scarcely conducive
to unfettered idealism.
The dictates of realpolitik were evident in a response by a Foreign
Office official to the conspiracy-criminal organization plan in April 1945.
J. C. Wardrop minuted to a member of the Lord Chancellor’s Office that
‘‘the proposal seems rather to suggest that a judgement of the . . . tribunal
declaring [for example] the SS to be an organisation of ‘criminal charac-
ter’ would enable us to proceed against any member on the basis of his
membership alone and without the necessity to prove him guilty of an
actual crime. If this assumption is correct, the proposal is a very good
one, so long as we can punish under it as many or as few members of
the organisation in question as we think fit.’’43
The stress was on the lower parameter. The author’s enthusiasm for
the idea of guilt by association was not generally shared in the Foreign
Office, whose officials remained staunchly legalistic in approach, but the
concern to limit the potential number of trials of Nazi underlings most
certainly was.44
Ultimately, as we have seen, the IMT judged that the burden of
proving the individual member’s knowledge of the criminality of the
organization remained with the prosecutor. Had the will and resources
existed to scour Germany in the way that Jackson wanted, this pro-
nouncement would have implied innumerable protracted cases rather than
the summary proceedings envisaged in the conspiracy-criminal organiza-
tion plan. It is improbable in any case that courts constituted under Brit-
ish military law would have been prepared to enact what Wardrop termed
42 Robert Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law (London, 1960),
pp. 219–26.
43 PRO, LCO 2/2980, Wardrop to Coldstream (of LCO), 18 April 1945; emphasis
added.
44 PRO, LCO 2/2980, minutes (taken in early April) by attorney general of a meeting
with American and FO representatives.
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‘‘wholesale punishment by way of quasi-judicial proceedings,’’ and a
pronounced legal conservatism meant that British officialdom never lost
its reservations about courts and charges of a ‘‘Nuremberg character.’’45
Thus in the Royal Warrant trials the ‘‘mere fact’’ that a defendant held
a high rank in a criminal organization such as the SS made no real impact
on the court.46 Conversely, the British were certainly not prepared to
embark on full-scale legal action in any court against each of the esti-
mated 19,500 criminal organization members in their custody in the pe-
riod immediately after the IMT trial.47 It should be noted that this esti-
mate was probably significantly less than the actual number of criminal
Germans and collaborators in the British zone.
Like the American occupation authorities, the British adopted a real-
istic stance and put most of the members of the criminal organizations
through the ordinary denazification courts, the Spruchkammern, which
could impose maximum sentences of ten years and which were more
about preventing Nazis from holding positions of influence in postwar
Germany than about judicial investigation of the past.48 Thousands
who were judged ‘‘comparatively innocuous’’ were released without
trial. Particularly ‘‘hard core’’ suspects were processed through courts
constituted under British judges by the British element of the Allied Con-
trol Council for Germany.49 Overall, however, denazification under the
British was far less extensive than under the Americans.
The cases tried under the Royal Warrant were, like the American
Dachau program, concerned solely with substantive crimes, though again
membership of a criminal organization could also be charged against
many of the defendants in either series. Other than the ‘‘Belsen trials,’’
the British conducted various proceedings against the staff of the Neuen-
gamme concentration camp and its Aussenlager (subcamps), and against
the personnel of the Ravensbru¨ck women’s camp. The Ravensbru¨ck case
was unusual in that the camp was situated beyond the British zone, in
Soviet-occupied territory; several suspects were ultimately handed over
to the Soviets for trial. The other cases that constituted the majority of
45 PRO, LCO 2/2980, Wardrop to Coldstream, 18 April 1945. The expression ‘‘Nu-
remberg character,’’ used by the secretary of state for war, Frederick Bellenger, in 1947,
reflected ongoing suspicion of the novel, American-led IMT trial. PRO, WO 311/648,
Bellenger to Bevin, 3 October 1947.
46 PRO, WO 309/1674, quarterly report of legal section WCG North West Europe
(NWE) October to December 1947.
47 PRO, FO 371/64712, suggested redraft of report, initialed by Patrick Dean, Brown
et al., 5 June 1947.
48 PRO, FO 371/64713, c8815/7675/180, FO brief for secretary of state, 2 June 1947.
49 PRO, FO 371/64712, draft report of lord chancellor on war crimes trials, and com-
ments on draft report by Dean et al., 5 June 1947.
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the Royal Warrant trials were against the personnel of several Gestapo
prisons and Arbeitserziehungslager in the British zone (the murderous
‘‘work education camps’’ to which forced foreign laborers—and particu-
larly Russian or Polish workers—deemed to be ‘‘slacking’’ were sent)
and against the murderers of British servicemen, primarily airmen.50
The limited trial program would court little diplomatic controversy
and would be comparatively cheap, dealing more and more with localized
offenses and lower-ranking defendants. With the passage of time the tri-
als were increasingly limited to atrocities against British servicemen.
Most of the little interest—apart from antipathy—regarding the trials
shown by the British public was on matters relating directly to Britain,
and, understandably, the government felt a particular duty to investigate
these. Priscilla Dale Jones illustrates that the pursuit until the end of 1948
of the murderers of fifty British airmen at Stalag Luft III (a prisoner-of-
war camp in Silesia) in March 1944 was vital in the prolongation of the
British trial program. Immortalized in the Hollywood film The Great
Escape, the Stalag Luft murders held the interest of the British public
like no other case and consumed a great part of the time and budget of
the war crimes investigation unit.51
The emphasis on such crimes was one manifestation of the consis-
tent tightening of the parameters of the Royal Warrant program. At the
beginning of that program responsibility was jettisoned by the War Office
for cases pertaining to concentration camps outside the British zone, apart
from parts of the Ravensbru¨ck case. Further, in attempting to process
more trials and to give the impression of greater activity—as in the mat-
ter of confusing numbers of cases and individuals tried—War Office of-
ficials considered trying easier, more trivial cases. Likewise, owing to
criticism of the length of time the ‘‘Belsen’’ trial had taken, it was pro-
posed to divide large cases into smaller ones that could be disposed of
more speedily, though the whole would then in fact take longer.52 Also,
50 See, e.g., PRO, WO 309/1674, quarterly reports of legal section WCG (NWE),
July to September 1947, October to December 1947. On the Arbeitserziehungslager, see
Gabrielle Lofti, KZ der Gestapo: Arbeitserziehungslager im dritten Reich (Stuttgart,
2000). More generally on the Royal Warrant series, see A. P. V. Rogers, ‘‘War Crimes
Trials under the Royal Warrant: British Practice, 1945–1949,’’ International and Com-
parative Law Quarterly 39 (1990): 780–800.
51 PRO, FO 371/64723, c15911/7675/180, Barratt (of JAG) to O’Grady, 9 December
1947; Priscilla Dale Jones, ‘‘Nazi Atrocities against Allied Airmen: Stalag Luft III
and the End of British War Crimes Trials,’’ Historical Journal 41, no. 2 (1998): 543–
65.
52 PRO, WO 309/1, cable, WO to Headquarters (HQ) 21 Army Group, British Army
of Occupation of the Rhine (BAOR), 19 June 1945; WO 309/1, Chilton to WO, 16 De-
cember 1945; commander-in-chief of Rhine Army to undersecretary of state in the WO
and JAG, 3 November 1945.
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in most cases the time to be allowed between formal charging and the
beginning of trial was limited to fourteen days.53
The idea of prioritizing trivial crimes was rejected, and it seems
that, by the lights of the British prosecutors at least, emphasis remained
on the more serious ones.54 (Though in February 1946, e.g., months after
these ideas had been discussed, the JAG was expending energy on the
trial of one Otto Nickel. Nickel was finally sentenced to two months
imprisonment for the ‘‘ill-treatment’’ of ‘‘an unknown Allied airman.’’)55
The principle of division of cases was, however, applied, as, for instance,
in the prosecution of the subsidiary Belsen trials and the Neuengamme
case.56 These deliberations were closely related to the issue of ending
the trial program in toto, a question that was debated from almost as
soon as trials began, in autumn 1945.57 The investigators and prosecutors
worked to impossible deadlines to expedite the conclusion of what was
nevertheless becoming an increasingly controversial aspect of Allied oc-
cupation policy both in Germany and Britain.58 By cabinet decision of
November 1946, the British government was looking to wind down the
whole process of war crimes trials.59
In October 1945, the attorney general decreed that as a minimum
five hundred cases be tried in Germany by 30 April 1946. This would
have entailed the completion of three cases per day between 1 November
1945 and the end of April.60 A total of five hundred individuals (rather
than cases; the target having been arbitrarily modified) was only reached
in the early months of 1947.61 The quarterly average of individuals tried
from early 1947 until mid-1948 was approximately equal to the baseline
target of fifty cases per month that had been established in May 1946,
after the failure to meet the attorney general’s initial target.62
Working through new cases and the backlog of old ones was a
53 PRO, WO 309/1, minute, fols. 30, 31 October 1945.
54 PRO, FO 371/64718, c13471/7675/180, note on policy by Shapcott, 15 October
1947.
55 Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives, Wade Papers I, file 1, app. C, case 47.
56 PRO, WO 309/1, commander in chief of BAOR to undersecretary of state (WO)
and JAG, 3 November 1945.
57 Dale Jones, ‘‘Nazi Atrocities against Allied Airmen,’’ p. 548.
58 PRO, WO 309/1, fol. 28, minute of 30 October 1945; WO 309/1642, Deputy
Military Governor’s Office, CCG British Element, to regional commissioners, n.d., on
British and German desire to end the whole process of trials generally.
59 PRO, PREM 8/391, Command Paper (CM) (46) 94th Conclusions, 4 November
1946.
60 PRO, WO 309/1, fol. 27, minute of 12 November 1945, signature illegible.
61 See Dale Jones, ‘‘Nazi Atrocities against Allied Airmen’’; PRO, FO 371/66555,
u515/2173, minute on number of war criminals tried, 25 February 1947.
62 See the quarterly reports of the legal section WCG (NWE) in PRO, WO 309/1674
for figures of tried; WO 309/1, fol. 42, BAOR to WO, May 1946.
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lengthy process, and it was only in April 1948 that a time limit was set
on the trial program. 1 September 1948 was the date by which all pro-
ceedings were to be completed and beyond which extradition requests
would only be granted subject to the provision of prima facie evidence
of murder as defined under German law.63 The war crimes trial center
in northwest Europe was set to disband in October 1948, and through
that year the number of courts functioning simultaneously was increased
from three to five to facilitate that goal.64
As with all the prosecuting nations, the total number of Germans
tried was not even in the same league as the number of suspects who
more than warranted punishment. Indeed, Foreign Office Undersecretary
Basil Newton explicitly recognized the potential limitations of the British
commitment when he inquired as early as November 1945 what total
number of prosecutions would suffice as ‘‘politically acceptable.’’65 A
certain realism is necessary alongside understandable distaste when con-
sidering the ultimate failure of Britain (alongside the United States) in
what Tom Bower has called ‘‘the purging of Nazi Germany.’’66 Predict-
ably, cold war pressures topped the agenda. In addition—and the two
factors are certainly not unrelated—the resources at the disposal of the
investigating and prosecuting units were meager; they were experiencing
severe manpower and financial shortages. The general British austerity
drive of the postwar years was particularly acute in the occupation bud-
get. Staff shortages resulting from demobilization were experienced al-
most as soon as trial preparations began in 1945;67 manpower limitations
also resulted in difficulties in locating both the accused and relevant wit-
nesses.68 Finally, expedition was further hindered by technical problems
relating to the unusual courtroom procedures of war crimes trials.69
Together, these factors explain why only just over a thousand Axis
nationals and collaborators were tried by British military courts. How-
ever, that the trial program was finally terminated in 1949, three years
after the cabinet decision for closure, bespeaks the pursuit of at least a
limited justice, if primarily for British servicemen. Rather than simply
63 Establishing such a prima facie case was by no means straightforward. For the
peculiarities of German law in this connection, see, e.g., Martin Broszat, ‘‘Siegerjustiz
oder strafrechtliche Selbstreinigung: Aspekte der Vergangenheitsbewa¨ltigung der
deutschen Justiz wa¨hrend der Besatzungszeit,’’ Vierteljahreshefte fu¨r Zeitgeschichte 29
(1981): 477–544, here 480–81.
64 PRO, WO 309/1646, fol. 146A, HQ Hamburg District to HQ BAOR, 20 March
1948; fol. 168, note by Dyas, 13 August 1948.
65 Cited in Dale Jones, ‘‘Nazi Atrocities against Allied Airmen,’’ p. 549.
66 Bower, Blind Eye to Murder.
67 PRO, WO 309/1, cable, WO to HQ 21 Army Group, BAOR, 19 June 1945.
68 PRO, WO 309/1, fol. 42, BAOR to WO, May 1946.
69 PRO, WO 309/1, fol. 27, minute of 12 November 1945, signature illegible.
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abandoning investigations arbitrarily, moves toward closing the pro-
gram—after incitements from the Attorney General’s Office, the Lord
Chancellor’s Office, and Prime Minister Attlee himself—were condi-
tional on securing sufficient personnel to deal with the cases in hand.70
Closure became a matter of practical exigency and political expedi-
ency for the British government in the face of growing German hostility
to, and British apathy concerning, ‘‘war crimes’’ trials.71 There was also,
however, a genuine feeling that prolonging the trial process was some-
how unfair, and certainly ‘‘un-British.’’ Even at this close proximity to
the war, Churchill was echoing the thoughts of many when he suggested
famously that justice delayed even a few years was not justice at all.72
This response will be recognizable to anyone who kept abreast of the
campaign in the last decades of the twentieth century to prosecute war
criminals living in Britain.73 It was partially founded in an Anglo-centric
lack of appreciation of the extremity of Nazi criminality, as is illustrated
by Churchill’s announcement in the House of Commons in October 1948
(by which point he had become a convinced opponent of trials), that
there were only a few exceptional cases ‘‘such as the slaughter of the
men of the Norfolk Regiment . . . [which] it was right to pursue, as one
would pursue a common case of murder, even after fifteen years had
passed before it came to light.’’74
Ending the trials became a policy aim. As such it was pursued ad-
ministratively according to the same principles as any other executive
action. There are notable cases of dissent among the British legal person-
nel in Germany, but the structural-political emphasis was heavily on the
side of closure. The populations of the civilian internment camps that
contained suspected war criminals were radically reduced by extradition
and also by the wholesale release of suspects who were not requested
by any nation—810 in the last quarter of 1947, for instance.75 Some cases
70 PRO, WO 309/1, Chilton to WO, 16 December 1945; WO 311/9, lord chancellor’s
report Overseas Reconstruction Committee (47) 27; J. H. Hoffman, ‘‘German Field Mar-
shals as War Criminals? A British Embarrassment,’’ Journal of Contemporary History
23, no. 1 (1988): 17–36, here 18–19.
71 On the diminishing of interest and even the growth of opposition to trials in Britain
after the trial of the major war criminals, see University of Sussex Archive, Mass-Obser-
vation Archive file report 2424A, 27 September 1946; directive replies, September 1946.
72 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, 8 vols. (London, 1988), 8:438–42.
73 David Cesarani, Justice Delayed: How Britain Became a Refuge for Nazi War
Criminals (London, 1992); see also the letters page of the Daily Telegraph (5 April 1999).
74 Gilbert, Churchill, 8:441–42. See also Donald Bloxham, ‘‘Punishing German Sol-
diers during the Second World War: The Case of Erich von Manstein,’’ Patterns of Preju-
dice 33, no. 4 (1999): 25–45.
75 PRO, WO 309/1674, quarterly report of legal section WCG (NWE), October to
December 1947.
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were handed over by the war crimes investigation staff to the Control
Commission tribunals, some ultimately to German courts. Many crimi-
nals would then run free or face lenient judgment, but at all times the
British legal machinery in Germany could point to the fact that it was
stretched to deal with those suspects under investigation.
We can see from the foregoing discussion that the trial of prominent
Germans was not an issue for most of the duration of the British zonal
trial program. With a few exceptions, such as the trial of Field Marshal
Kesselring in Venice in 1947, the British had avoided the problem of
trying ‘‘majors,’’ sometimes by putting them through the low-key ‘‘de-
nazification’’ process or, preferably, by transferring them to the U.S.
zone. This policy had only excited some criticism from the Americans
and some from British prosecutors involved in the IMT trial.76 Yet at
the tail end of the program, one of the most controversial of all cases
fell fortuitously into the hands of the British authorities. The trial of Erich
von Manstein combined the specter of massive German opposition to
the prosecution of a popular and vaunted German field marshal with that
of open scrutiny of British trial policy by both the United States and
the USSR. A special war crimes unit was formed to pursue this final,
controversial proceeding, in what was dubbed ‘‘Operation Marco.’’77 The
prosecution brought abruptly to a head the thorny issue of ongoing legal
redress against Nazism.
The Manstein Case
The initial context was the second half of 1947, when OCCWC was
involved in preparations for what would turn out to be the twelfth and
last of the subsequent proceedings against high-ranking officers from the
High Command of the Wehrmacht and the various service branches
thereof. Three such soldiers—all field marshals—were in British cus-
tody: Gerd von Rundstedt, Walther von Brauchitsch, and Manstein.78
Each was implicated in the issuance and distribution of criminal orders
on the eastern front. They had also helped to provide logistical support
and assistance to the SS Einsatzgruppen, the itinerant killing squads de-
76 PRO, LCO 2/2989, J. P. Henniker (of FO) to Addis (of 10 Downing St.), 6 Febru-
ary 1947.
77 PRO, WO 309/1646, fol. 168, note by Dyas, 13 August 1948; and throughout WO
309/1670.
78 In fact, Rundstedt was officially an American prisoner; he had been loaned to the
British for interrogation after his capture in May 1945 and had thereafter caused confusion
at Nuremberg by declaring himself to be a British prisoner.
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ployed in the rear of the invading German armies in 1941 to murder
Jews and others.
The British army had known of OCCWC interest in the three since
the beginning of 1947 but had not investigated their deeds.79 When in
August of that year Taylor forwarded some of the evidence gathered on
them and on one Colonel-General Adolf Strauss to Hartley Shawcross—
and the military governor of the U.S. zone, General Lucius Clay, did
likewise to his temporary British opposite number, Air Marshall Sir
Sholto Douglas—it was an obvious reminder of the British obligation
to consider legal proceedings or allow extradition to other countries.80
The British could not just discreetly ‘‘drop’’ the issue after a time
as desired, because it was returned to the fore in the first half of 1948
by extradition demands from Poland and the USSR, and a request from
OCCWC for the field marshals’ presence at Nuremberg as witnesses in
the high command case.81 The Polish government wished to try Brau-
chitsch and Manstein, and the Soviets likewise wished to try Rundstedt
and Manstein, in connection with the crimes committed in the invasion
and occupation of those two countries. The British government rejected
both of these requests out of a legitimate distrust of Soviet legal proce-
dure, and out of fear of the damage such a surrender would do to Anglo-
German relations and to more debatable concerns about Polish justice.82
(It certainly illustrated the different rules applying to ‘‘major’’ and ‘‘mi-
nor’’ war criminals, respectively, however; hundreds of the latter had
been transferred eastward in the attempt to clear the British internment
camps of suspects.) Yet it was implicit in the rejections that the British
would try the soldiers themselves, and the cabinet had little choice but
to proceed and preserve what good faith remained among the former
allies.83
The political sensitivity of the case would even now bear greatly
on its development, and arguments against trial were given added force
by the advancing years of the suspects.84 It was natural that Brauchitsch,
Rundstedt, Manstein, and Strauss should experience some of the frailties
of relative old age. Brauchitsch’s health was clearly the most degenerate,
and in the light of a series of examinations in the first quarter of 1948,
79 PRO, WO 309/1456, memo to Parker, OCCWC liaison with BAOR, from Norma
Ervin of OCCWC, 4 February 1947.
80 Hoffman, ‘‘German Field Marshals as War Criminals?’’ pp. 17–18; NARA, RG
260, Records of the Chief-of-Staff, box 1, Clay to Douglas, 19 August 1947.
81 PRO, LCO 2/2994, Reed to Shawcross, 14 November 1947. Feelings stimulated
by direct experience of German disdain for the trials.
82 PRO, PREM 8/1112, CM (48) 47th Conclusions, 5 July 1948.
83 Ibid.
84 In June 1948 they were respectively 67, 73, 61, and 69 years old.
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the cabinet decision to try the four had left his disposition subject to his
prevailing medical state; he died of coronary thrombosis in October of
that year.85 The condition of the others was far from clear-cut, however,
and in March 1948 a Home Office medical panel declared each one fit
for trial.86 Early in 1949 a combined Home Office and Army board of
doctors examined the three again and found that only Manstein was now
fit; and this despite the fact that a few days previously doctors at the
soldiers’ Mu¨nster Lager prison hospital had adjudged only Strauss unfit.87
A trio consisting of the Lord Chancellor, Hartley Shawcross, and a medi-
cal expert was thus brought in to make the final decision as to whom
would be tried.88
That Manstein alone reached trial in August 1949—two years after
Taylor had forwarded the incriminating evidence—may be ascribed to
the ultracaution of the triumvirate. Given the proportions that the case
had assumed, it would have been disastrous for the Labour government
had one of the accused collapsed in the dock. It should not be unduly
surprising to learn that Rundstedt’s lawyer did not consider his client’s
health to have deteriorated over the four and a half months since he had
been officially charged, nor that Rundstedt lived for more than a decade
after 1949.89
In Britain the trial of senior soldiers was probably more problematic
than that of any other group of Germans. Few Britons could be found
to stand up for SS members such as the Gestapo agents who had gunned
down the Stalag Luft III airmen in 1944, or such as Joseph Kramer, the
notorious commandant of Belsen. Even Lord (Maurice) Hankey, one of
the foremost public critics of trials, was prepared to forgo releasing pris-
oners convicted of ‘‘sheer sadism.’’90 However, soldiers were viewed as
a different category by those convinced of the apoliticism and honorable
tradition of the regular military.91 Many of the staff of British Army War
85 PRO, PREM 8/1112, CM (48) 47th Conclusions, 5 July 1948, memo to cabinet
from Emmanuel Shinwell, 28 March 1949.
86 PRO, PREM 8/1112, memo to cabinet from Shawcross, 22 June 1948; Bower,
Blind Eye to Murder, p. 252.
87 PRO, PREM 8/1112, memo to cabinet from Shinwell, 28 March 1949: Bower,
Blind Eye to Murder, pp. 259–60.
88 PRO, PREM 8/1112, CM (49), 24th Conclusions, 31 March 1949; CM (49), 32d
Conclusions, 5 May 1949.
89 LHCMA, LH 9/24/77, Walter Grimm to Liddell Hart, 18 May 1949.
90 Lord Hankey, Politics, Trials and Errors (Oxford, 1950), p. 145.
91 Classic statements of this often one-eyed support of German soldiery may be found
in R. T. Paget, Manstein: His Campaigns and His Trial, (London, 1951). See also Hankey,
Politics, Trials and Errors; Montgomery Belgion, Epitaph on Nuremberg: A Letter In-
tended to Have Been Sent to a Friend Temporarily Abroad (London, 1946); F. J. P. Veale,
Advance to Barbarism: How the Reversion to Barbarism in Warfare and War-Trials Men-
aces Our Future (Appleton, Wis., 1948). Of the welter of current literature on the crimi-
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Crimes Group, northwest Europe, withdrew their services in protest
against the planned prosecution.92 In Parliament, two peers set up a public
fund, to which Churchill—by this time a staunch critic of trials—was
an early subscriber, to provide legal defense in this ‘‘belated trial of an
aged German general.’’ In all, £2,000 were raised. The lower house con-
tributed two defense counselors free of charge: Reginald Paget as the
senior and Samuel Silkin as his junior.93 Notably, Silkin was Jewish, a
factor that opponents of trial seized on as an indication of the justness
of their cause.94
With these forces arrayed in opposition alongside the German antip-
athy toward trials, it is apparent that only by perverse circumstance did
Manstein become the last British prisoner to stand in the dock for war
crimes in the postwar era. His case provided the clearest illustration of
why the British government wished to close the book on the issue of
war criminals. Indeed, by the time of his trial, the War Office had enacted
a review of every other sentence passed by a Royal Warrant Court. This
was the first phase in a process that would see the last war criminal
released in the British zone in 1957 but was also a logical outcome of
the political pressure to cease legal reckoning with the crimes of Nazism,
for the continued existence of a class of German convicts would perpetu-
ate the controversies that surrounded their trials in the first place.
Sentence Review, ‘‘Clemency,’’ and Premature Releases
The Number One War Crimes Review of Sentences Board was con-
stituted in January 1949 to review all sentences passed in Royal Warrant
trials in Europe and to ‘‘ensure uniformity of punishment for similar
offences.’’ This meant ‘‘similar offences,’’ not only across Europe, but
also those adjudicated on by the number two review board operating in
the Far East. (The review did not affect Manstein’s sentence, which was
passed too late.) Underlying the principle of sentence, ‘‘equalization’’
was certainly a wish to be seen by the West Germans to be beyond
reproach in terms of legal practice and egalitarianism. This desire was
both pragmatic and idealistic, serving to minimize the growing German
complaints about the trials and to further the lessons of the benefits of
democratic legal process. The review meant fairly widespread reduction
because it was illegal to increase shorter sentences in the interests of
nality of parts of the Wehrmacht, see esp. Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann, eds., Ver-
nichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg, 1995).
92 PRO, PREM 8/1112, Shinwell to Lord Jowitt, 8 November 1948.
93 Paget, Manstein, pp. 71–74.
94 See ibid., generally; Veale, Advance to Barbarism.
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equalization. Of the 247 trial cases considered, involving 564 convicts,
107 individual sentences were either commuted or partially remitted. Im-
portantly, it was also stated that the quantum of a life sentence was 21
years imprisonment. Equally importantly, the review was declared to be
‘‘final,’’ with no more to be considered ‘‘except under exceptional cir-
cumstances.’’95
‘‘Finality’’ was clearly not a constant, however, because a further
review was instituted at the beginning of 1951. As Hartley Shawcross
objected, this contrasted with the practice of the British Home Office to
review sentences every four years, and there was certainly no reason to
seek uniformity of sentencing more than once.96 However, the proposed
formation of a European Defence Community against the perceived So-
viet threat spelt out ever more clearly the necessity for some sort of
German military contribution.97 This was altogether improbable while
overtly nationalistic West German societal elites were vocally challeng-
ing the Allied occupation of Germany and the right of Britain, France,
and the United States to pass moral judgment on the wartime past. The
war criminals issue had become one of the most highly charged diplo-
matic issues, particularly the matter of the incarcerated military leaders,
who were held up as symbolic of Germany’s degradation at the hands
of others.98
The following statement of Foreign Office policy to the cabinet in
February 1951 speaks for itself as a classic example of the diplomatic
adornment of political pragmatism.
It is now our declared object, and that of the French and United States’
Governments, to bring the Federal Republic into full political and economic
cooperation with the West, and discussions are already in progress with a
view to enabling Germany to contribute to western defence. When a factor
of serious importance emerges which hinders the implementation of this
new policy towards Germany, it is incumbent on . . . His Majesty’s Govern-
ment to take this factor into consideration and to give it due political
weight. . . . It is with the above considerations in mind that the present
review of [war crimes] sentences in the United Kingdom Zone is being
undertaken.99
95 Wade papers, Wade I, file 1.
96 PRO, PREM 8/1570, CP (51) 45, memo by attorney general to cabinet, 8 February
1951.
97 On the issue of rearmament, see David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West
German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996).
98 Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik, pp. 202, 207, 249, 292.
99 PRO, PREM 8/1570, CP (51) 38, 6 February 1951, secret memo by minister of
state.
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A less euphemistic analysis had been provided by Patrick Dean of the
Foreign Office and the British War Crimes Executive when he read the
runes of the international situation as early as June 1946. Having berated
the leniency of British sentencing compared to that of the American tri-
bunals at Dachau, he averred, ‘‘from the point of view of the Germans
there is nothing to be gained in acquitting or imprisoning for short terms
these terrible murderers. Those that are imprisoned will only be released
just when the Allied control of Germany begins to relax.’’100
Despite the possibility of a popular British backlash against the re-
lease of war criminals, by 1951 the political impetus for pro-German
action was in the ascendant. Besides, the effects of British policy over
war criminals could be substantially concealed from the domestic public.
With the system of checks that was in place already—some of which
were an inherent part of a more-or-less equitable legal system, and some
of which, like the second review round, were the product of political
expediency—light was clearly visible at the end of the tunnel for the
convicts.
The following hypothetical instance may elucidate the extent to
which the system favored the criminal. A man convicted in 1946 for a
capital crime, murder, and consequently sentenced to death might well
have had his death sentence commuted by the confirming officer to one
of life imprisonment. With the quantum of ‘‘life’’ established as twenty-
one years and the very widespread—indeed, often indiscriminate—use
of a one-third reduction of sentences for ‘‘good behavior,’’ this murderer
faced a maximum of fourteen years in prison and thus release in 1960.
Had he benefited from sentence review or the gift of ‘‘clemency’’
(granted in individual cases for nonlegal reasons such as grounds of com-
passion), his sentence would have been shorter still.
The above case, it must be remembered, is an example of an ‘‘aver-
age’’ criminal—one of no remarkable rank or public repute. Extra effort
went into securing the freedom of more esteemed individuals like
Manstein. He was sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment in Decem-
ber 1949; on the occasion of confirmation of his sentence at the beginning
of 1950, it was reduced to twelve years by the commander in chief of
the BAOR, General Keightley, despite legal advice that there was no
need for this.101 And with the mounting of Western European defence
pressures, and after the reaccession of the Conservatives in October 1951,
the prospects for senior soldiers, in particular, looked progressively
better.
100 PRO, FO 371/57671, u5804/5488/73, minute by Dean, 18 June 1946.
101 PRO, FO 371/85914, CG786/48/184, Shinwell to Bevin, 13 February 1950; em-
phasis added.
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Immediately on his return to Downing Street, Churchill moved to
release all of the remaining officers in British custody.102 The more cau-
tious Anthony Eden, as foreign secretary, stressed that ‘‘clemency’’
could only be used where it was justified in terms of the specifics of the
individual case.103 However, he swiftly produced another legal device that
unfairly aided many war criminals. In December 1951, Eden persuaded
the cabinet to institute the policy of counting pretrial custody against
sentences imposed. With the exploitation of a semantic loophole, this
ostensibly equitable measure frequently doubled reductions already ac-
counted for, as the Manstein case illustrates.
Anticipating the need for clarity, the Manstein court explicitly de-
clared his sentence would date from the day of judgment, 19 December
1949, and that ‘‘the period during which the accused has been in custody
has been taken into account.’’ In the face of this apparently unequivocal
proclamation, Eden contended that the phrase ‘‘taken into account’’ did
not mean that pretrial custody had been fully ‘‘reckoned towards [the]
sentence.’’ (In fact, the principle was from henceforth established that
pretrial custody could now be discounted from the sentence in every case
where the court had not explicitly stated the formula that time previously
served would be ‘‘set off in its entirety.’’)104 Thus Manstein’s original
sentence, reduced on ‘‘confirmation’’ to twelve years, was reduced by
a further period of approximately four and a half years. As did so many
others, Manstein also acquired a further reduction of his twelve-year term
by dint of the rule on ‘‘good conduct.’’ Having been sentenced in De-
cember 1949 to eighteen years imprisonment, he was scheduled for re-
lease on 7 May 1953. In any case, he was actually out of prison from
August 1952, given medical parole for a minor operation and then an
extended convalescence period at a health resort in Allmendigen (his
hometown); all this coinciding conveniently with the period in which
West Germany was set to ratify the European Defence Community
Treaty.105
With the Conservative government pulling out all the stops in this
way, on the back of the concessions made under the previous Labour
administration, it is not hard to see why the last war criminal departed
British custody within a dozen years of V-E Day. The only Germans
still imprisoned as a result in part of British efforts were those ‘‘major
102 PRO, FO 800/846, Churchill to Eden, 29 November 1951; Churchill to Eden, 8
June 1952.
103 PRO, FO 800/846, Eden to Churchill, 29 August 1952.
104 PRO, FO 371/104159, CW1663/13, Kirkpatrick to Eden, 23 April 1953; PRO,
Cabinet 129/48, C (51) 54, foreign secretary’s note to cabinet, 18 December 1951.
105 PRO, FO 371/104159, CW1663/13, Kirkpatrick to Eden, 23 April 1953.
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war criminals’’ under quadripartite authority at Spandau, because the re-
quired Soviet acquiescence in their release was not obtained. Yet though
the British punishment program was concluded in a very different politi-
cal atmosphere to that in which it began, it must be stressed that the
processes that culminated in that termination had been set in train more
than a decade earlier.
Conclusions
To return then to the introduction: British war crimes trial policy has
been justifiably criticized. Many leads were not followed up by British
investigators, screening of suspects was inadequate, many of the crimi-
nals who fell into British hands were not tried, many who were tried
were not punished severely enough, and many of the sentences that were
handed out were compromised by the processes of ‘‘clemency’’ and sen-
tence review from 1949 onward. The chief political reasons for these
deficiencies are easy enough to ascertain: war-weariness and adjustment
to the postwar international climate. The replacement in the eyes of the
western Allies of Germany by the Soviet Union as the menace to world
peace and occidental, ‘‘Christian values,’’ demanded the increasingly le-
nient treatment of the former to encourage solidarity against the latter.
Though the British trial program assuredly did concern many crimes
against non-British nationals (a claim that few of the other European
states could make), the limited legal accounting for crimes against
Jews—not to mention that of Slavs, the ‘‘disabled,’’ and the Roma—
was also founded on the very limited remit of the Royal Warrant. That
remit was characteristic of a legal conservatism affecting the entire Brit-
ish punishment policy, embodied in the emphasis on ‘‘war crimes’’ as
traditionally defined, which, in turn, reflected the cultural foundations of
a society that had found itself incapable of responding to the enormity
of the Nazi racial genocides.106
It would be crude and unfair to leave the analysis at this level, how-
ever. That many criminals went untried in the British zone (and every-
where else) should not blind us to the more than one thousand who were,
nor to the considerable efforts that went into trying them, nor to the
existence of a small but significant opposition to the ending of the trial
program. Moreover, the occupation of Germany was not intended to be
wholly punitive. The comparatively enlightened nature of the occupa-
106 See Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial: The War Crimes Trials in the Formation
of Holocaust History and Memory (Oxford, 2001); Tony Kushner, The Holocaust and
the Liberal Imagination (Oxford, 1994); Dale Jones, ‘‘British Policy towards German
Crimes against German Jews.’’
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tions of its western regions may be partially explained as regards the
British and American authorities by their lack of experience of Nazi
occupation, which both hindered full understanding of Nazi criminality
and tempered the desire for vengeance. Yet ‘‘democratization’’ rather
than ‘‘denazification’’—broadly defined—became the cardinal aim of
the project not merely out of economic considerations or the utilitarian
need for a strong anticommunist central European power but because of
the very reasonable assumption that the former was both worthy and
humanitarian.
Unlike the more structured American trial programs, the Royal War-
rant trials were basically enacted ad hoc. Accordingly, their frequency
and subject matter were to a greater degree at the mercy of the ebb and
flow of public and political opinion. Within those general parameters,
and given the personnel and budgetary limitations, it was consistent with
a focus on British national interest that priority was increasingly given
to the prosecution of crimes committed against British servicemen. It
might be said that punishment in this category was an attempt at a literal
interpretation of occupation justice, whereas in all other cases punish-
ment was a more limited, metaphorical affair. Given the restrictive legal-
ism of the British lawgivers, and the vast scope of Nazi criminality, ac-
ceptance that a symbolic reckoning was the most that could be expected
was both encouraged and welcomed.
In the final analysis, every trial program fell victim to the relativiz-
ing force of political exigency. The American-led attempt to assert the
rule of law over the capriciousness of international affairs may have left
an important legacy for posterity, a seed that is perhaps now coming to
fruition in the Hague, but in the peculiar circularity of postwar develop-
ments it was rebuffed. From shortly after its initiation, British punish-
ment policy was predicated on recognition of the inexorability of that
rejection.
